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ilton Friedman died November 16, 2006, at the age of 94. Any
attempt to put his contributions to economics into perspective can
only begin to suggest the vast variety of ideas he discussed. Bur-
ton (1981, 53) commented that “attempting to portray the work of Milton
Friedman...isliketrying to catch the Niagara Falls in a pint pot.” 1 At the
beginning of his career, Friedman adopted two hypotheses that isolated him
from the prevailing intellectual mainstream. First, central banks are respon-
sible for inﬂation and deﬂation. Second, markets work efﬁciently to allocate
resources and to maintain macroeconomic equilibrium.2 Because of his suc-
cess in advancing these ideas in a way that shaped the understanding of the
major economic events of this century and inﬂuenced public policy, Friedman
stands out as one of the great intellectuals of the 20th century.
I make use of taped material from an interview with Milton and Rose Friedman that Peter
Robinson and I conducted at the Hoover Institution on April 8, 1996. I also use taped material
from an interview with Milton Friedman conducted June 29, 1996, taped material sent by
Milton Friedman on November 26, 1996, and a taped interview with David Meiselman on
August 20, 1999. I am grateful for comments from Thomas Humphrey, David Laidler, Aaron
Steelman, and Roy Webb. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 For other overviews of Friedman’s contributions to economics, see Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2006); Hetzel (1997, 2006); Laidler (2005, forthcoming); and Timberlake (1999).
2 In contrast, the Keynesian orthodoxy of the day assumed that inﬂation arose from an eclec-
tic collection of causes and the price system did not work to maintain aggregate demand at a level
sufﬁcient to maintain full employment. The appeal of these assumptions, an appeal made irresistible
by the Depression, rested on their apparent descriptive realism rather than on the optimizing be-
havior assumed by neoclassical economics. See the quotations in the following section.2 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1. FRIEDMAN’S INTELLECTUAL ISOLATION
Until the 1970s, the economics profession overwhelmingly greeted Fried-
man’s ideas with hostility. Future generations can easily forget the homo-
geneity of the post-war intellectual environment. Friedman challenged an
intellectual orthodoxy. Not until the crisis within the economics profession in
the 1970s prompted by stagﬂation and the failure of the Keynesian diagnosis
of cost-push inﬂation with its remedy of wage and price controls did Fried-
man’s ideas begin to receive support. More than anyone, over the decades
of the 1950s and 1960s, Friedman kept debate alive within the economics
profession.3
Becauseeconomicsisadisciplinethatadvancesthroughdebateanddiver-
sity of views, it is hard to account for the near-consensus in macroeconomics
in the post-war period and also the antagonism that met Friedman’s challenge
to that consensus. In order to place his ideas in perspective, this section pro-
vides some background on prevailing views in the 1950s and 1960s. The
Depression had created a near-consensus that the price system had failed and
that it had failed because of the displacement of competitive markets with
large monopolies. Intellectuals viewed the rise of the modern corporation
and labor unions as evidence of monopoly power. They concluded that only
government, not market discipline, could serve as a countervailing force to
their monopoly power. Alvin Hansen (1941, 47), the American apostle of
Keynesianism, wrote:
In a free market no single unit was sufﬁciently powerful to exert any
appreciable control over the price mechanism. In a controlled economy
the government, the corporation, and organized groups all exercise a direct
inﬂuence over the market mechanism. Many contend that it is just this
imperfect functioning of the price system which explains the failure to
achieve reasonably full employment in the decade of the thirties....Itisnot
possible to go back to the atomistic order. Corporations, trade-unions, and
government intervention we shall continue to have. Modern democracy
does not mean individualism. It means a system in which private, voluntary
organization functions under general, and mostly indirect, governmental
control. Dictatorship means direct and speciﬁc control. We do not have
a choice between “plan and no plan.” We have a choice only between
democratic planning and totalitarian regimentation.
3 Other economists in what became known as the monetarist camp were Friedman’s stu-
dents: Phillip Cagan, David Meiselman, Richard Selden, and Richard Timberlake. Other mon-
etarists who were not students of Friedman were Karl Brunner, Thomas Mayer, Thomas Humphrey,
Allen Meltzer, Bill Poole, and, of course, Friedman’s frequent coauthor, Anna Schwartz. The term
“monetarist” came from Brunner (1968).R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 3
JacobViner (1940, 7–8), who taught Friedman price theory at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, aptly characterized the intellectual environment engendered
by the Depression:
Instead of the economy of effective competition, of freedom of individ-
ual initiative, of equality of economic opportunity, of steady and full
employment, pictured in the traditional theory, they [economists who
reject the competitive market model] see an economy dominated by giant
corporations in almost every important ﬁeld of industry outside agricul-
ture, an economy marked by great concentration of wealth and economic
power, and great disparity of income and of opportunity for betterment.
They note the apparently unending ﬂow of evidence from investigating
committees and courts of the ﬂagrant misuse of concentrated economic
power. They observe with alarm the failure of our economy for ten
successive years to give millions of men able to work and anxious to
work the opportunity to earn their daily bread. And seeing the actual
world so, they refuse to accept as useful for their purposes a type of
economic theory which as they read it either ignores these evils or treats
them as temporary, self-correcting aberrations or excrescences of what
is basically a sound economic system. Having rejected the conventional
picture of the system, they tend increasingly to adopt another one, rapidly
approaching equal conventionalization, but following another pattern, in
which the evils are inherent in the system and cannot be excised without
its drastic reconstruction and its substantial operation by government.
From the premise that the price system cannot coordinate economic activity,
intellectuals concluded that government should limit the freedom possessed
by individuals to make their own decisions.
The impetus to the Keynesian revolution was the belief that the price sys-
temcouldneitherallocateresourcesefﬁcientlynorensuremacroeconomicsta-
bility. Today, it is hard to recall how long that view dominated the economics
profession. Almost alone within the intellectual community in the 1950s and
1960s, Friedman advocated constraining government policy by rules in or-
der to allow the price system maximum latitude to work. In a debate with
Friedman, Walter Heller (Friedman and Heller 1969, 28, 78), chairman of the
CouncilofEconomicAdvisorsunderPresidentJohnF.Kennedy,expressedthe
consensus view in rejecting Friedman’s proposed rule calling for the money
stock to increase at a constant rate: “[L]et’s not lock the steering gear into
place, knowing full well of the twists and turns in the road ahead. That’s an
invitation to chaos.” Friedman replied:
The reason why that [the rule for steady money growth] doesn’t rigidly
lock you in, in the sense in which Walter was speaking, is that I don’t
believe money is all that matters. The automatic pilot is the price system.
It isn’t perfectly ﬂexible, it isn’t perfectly free, but it has a good deal4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of capacity to adjust. If you look at what happened to this country
when we adjusted to post-World War II, to the enormous decline in our
expenditures, and the shift in the direction of resources, you have to say
that we did an extraordinarily effective job of adjusting, and that this is
because there is an automatic pilot. But if an automatic pilot is going
to work, if you’re going to have the market system work, it has to have
some basic, stable framework.
2. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
Along with Friedman, a group of Chicago economists became known as the
Chicago School.4 Collectively, their work showed that within a competitive
marketplace the price system works efﬁciently to allocate resources.5 Fried-
man (1988, 32) wrote:
Fundamentally prices serve three functions....First, they transmit in-
formation....This function of prices is essential for enabling economic
activity to be coordinated. Prices transmit information about tastes, about
resource availability, about productive possibilities....Asecond function
that prices perform is to provide an incentive for people to adopt the
least costly methods of production and to use available resources for the
most highly valued uses. They perform that function because of their
third function, which is to determine who gets what and how much—the
distribution of income.
Friedman’s defense of free markets and criticism of government interven-
tion in the marketplace were always controversial. By basing his arguments
on the logic of price theory, Friedman kept debate on a high intellectual level.
Friedman (Friedman and Kuznets 1945) established the pattern for his contri-
butions to public policy in his book, Income from Independent Professional
Practice,coauthoredwithSimonKuznets. Init,hecalculatedtherateofreturn
to education by dentists and doctors. The book was one of the earliest studies
in the ﬁeld of human capital. Friedman also argued that the higher return
4 They included George Stigler, H. Gregg Lewis, Aaron Director, Ronald Coase, Gary Becker,
D. Gale Johnson, Theodore Schultz, and Arnold Harberger. Frank Knight, Henry Simons, and Jacob
Viner represented an earlier generation. Milton Friedman (1974b) and George Stigler (1962) both
regarded reference to a Chicago school as misleading because it did not do justice to the diversity
of intellectual opinion at Chicago. (For a discussion of the Chicago School, see Reder 1982.) For
example, Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s tried to have a preeminent Keynesian on its staff, ﬁrst
Lloyd Metzler and then Harry Johnson (who, nevertheless, became a critic of Keynesian ideas).
Apart from Chicago, the Mont Pelerin Society assembled intellectuals who defended free markets.
5 When I (Hetzel) was a student at Chicago, courses had problem sets and exams organized
around a list of questions requiring analysis of situations often drawn from newspapers. By the time
a student graduated from Chicago, he/she had applied the general competitive model to hundreds
of practical problems. Through continual practice, students developed a belief in the usefulness of
the competitive market model for economic analysis.R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 5
received by doctors on their investment in education relative to dentists de-
rivedfromrestrictionsonentryimposedbytheAmericanMedicalAssociation
(AMA).6
Friedman defused normative conﬂicts by deﬁning issues in terms of the
best way to achieve a common objective. Friedman ([1953] 1953, 5) wrote in
“The Methodology of Positive Economics”:
[D]ifferences about economic policy among disinterested citizens derive
predominantly from different predictions about the economic consequences
of taking action—differences that in principle can be eliminated by the
progress of positive economics—rather than from fundamental differences
in basic values, differences about which men can ultimately only ﬁght.
In an early application of economic analysis to a problem of public policy,
Friedman and Stigler (1946) criticized rent controls as counterproductive.
ExamplesofFriedman’sapplicationofpositiveeconomicanalysistopub-
licpolicyissuesarealmostboundless. Oneexampleis,“Inﬂation: Causesand
Consequences,” in Dollars and Deﬁcits (Friedman 1968, chap.1), which sum-
marized lectures delivered in Bombay, India, in 1963. Friedman described
the distorting effects of using government controls to suppress inﬂation and
explained how an overvalued exchange rate, propped up by exchange con-
trols, wastes resources. The waste cannot be justiﬁed no matter what the eco-
nomicphilosophyofthegovernment. Thechapteralsosummarizedsuccinctly
Friedman’s quantity-theory-of-money views and gave birth to the expression,
“Inﬂation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” (p. 39).
3. EARLY INTELLECTUAL FORMATION
In an autobiographical essay, Lives of the Laureates, Friedman (1986, 82)
wrote about his decision to study economics:
I graduated from college in 1932, when the United States was at the
bottom of the deepest depression in its history before or since. The
dominant problem of the time was economics. How to get out of the
depression? How to reduce unemployment? What explained the paradox
of great need on the one hand and unused resources on the other? Under
the circumstances, becoming an economist seemed more relevant to the
burning issues of the day than becoming an applied mathematician or an
actuary.
6 Friedman (tape recording, November 26, 1996) said, [The book] “did not get published
until after the war because of the controversy about the AMA raising the income of physicians
by restricting entry.” This work constituted Friedman’s Ph.D. thesis, which Columbia awarded to
Friedman in 1946.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Friedman was a graduate student at the University of Chicago in the aca-
demicyears1932–1933and1934–1935.7 In1933–1934, hewasatColumbia.
Friedman took Jacob Viner’s price theory course his ﬁrst year at Chicago.
Friedman (tape recording, November 26, 1996) recounted:
His Smithian temperament certainly did come across in that course.
Indeed, I believe that Viner’s course was one of the great experiences
of my life. It really opened up a new world for me. It enabled me to
see economics as a coherent discipline in a way that I had not seen it
before....[T]he belief that markets work at both the macroeconomic and
microeconomic level is something that I left Chicago with in 1935.
Columbia nourished Friedman’s empirical temperament. Friedman (tape
recording, November 26, 1996) said:
My empirical bent did not come from Chicago. Where it ultimately came
from I do not know, but it was certainly strongly affected by Arthur
Burns, and particularly by a seminar I took from him [at Columbia],
which consisted of going over his book on production trends. In addition,
it was reinforced by the course on statistics I took from Henry Schultz
at Chicago and the course in mathematical statistics at Columbia from
Hotelling. That course was extremely important.
Friedman’s ﬁrst job was with the National Resources Committee (NRC)
in 1935 in Washington, D.C., Friedman (tape recording, November 26, 1996)
worked on:
...developing a large scale study of consumer purchases. It was a study
intended to provide basic budget data to calculate the weights for the
CPI...The use of ranks did arise out of some problems that we met on
the study of consumer purchases. I wrote the ﬁrst draft of “The Use of
Ranks to Avoid the Assumption of Normality Implicit in the Analysis of
Variance” (Friedman 1937) while I was employed at the NRC. That paper
on the analysis of ranks was indeed one of the ﬁrst papers in the area of
nonparametric inference. It was not, however, my ﬁrst publication. My
ﬁrst publication was an article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in
November 1934 on Professor Pigou’s method of measuring elasticities of
demand from budgetary data. In fact, in the list of my publications, the
use of ranks was the ninth of my publications.
Friedman worked at the Treasury in the Division of Tax Research from
1941 to 1943. After he left the Treasury, Allen Wallis, a Chicago classmate,
brought him to the Statistical Research Group (SRG) at Columbia, which
7 For a review of economics at Chicago in the 1930s, see Reder (1982) and Patinkin (1981).R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 7
Wallis headed with Harold Hotelling. Friedman became associate director.
The SRG provided statistical support to various war-related projects. Wallis
(1980, 322) told how, during the Battle of the Bulge,Army ofﬁcers ﬂew from
EuropetoColumbiawhereFriedmanbriefedthemonworkhehaddoneonthe
performance of proximity fuses. Wallis also described how he and Friedman
pioneered what came to be known as sequential analysis. Wallis had been
giventheproblemofworkingonthenecessarysizeofsamplestouseintesting
military ordnance. Classical tests seemed to require too many observations: a
seasoned observer could tell more quickly whether an experimental ordnance
was working or not. Wallis (1980, 325–6) wrote, quoting from a 1950 letter:
If a wise and seasoned ordnance expert like Schuyler were on the premises,
he would see after the ﬁrst few thousand or even hundred [rounds] that
the experiment need not be completed....[I]t would be nice if there were
some mechanical rule which could be speciﬁed in advance stating the
conditions under which the experiment might be terminated earlier than
planned....Milton explored this idea on the train back to Washington
one day, and cooked up a rather pretty but simple example involving
Student’s t-test....He [Milton] said it was not unlikely, in his opinion,
that the idea would prove a bigger one than either of us would hit on
again in a lifetime....W aldwasnotenthusiastic....[H]is hunch was that
such tests do exist but would be found less powerful than existing tests.
On the second day, however, he phoned that he had found that such tests
do exist and are more powerful.8
At the SRG, Friedman worked with the Bayesian statistician Leonard
Savage, whom he described as “one of the few geniuses I have met in my
life” (tape recording, November 26, 1996). Friedman and Savage (1948) later
devised a form of the utility function that explained how the same person
might buy both insurance and a lottery ticket.
4. METHODOLOGY
At the SRG, Friedman worked solely as an applied statistician. In fall 1946,
he accepted a position at the University of Chicago teaching the price theory
course formerly taught byViner. At Chicago, Friedman began thinking about
howtoformulateandtesttheories. Theissuearoseinthecontextofthedebate
in the mid-1940s between institutionalists and what we now call neoclassical
economists over whether to organize economic theorizing around marginal
analysis. Friedman argued that, in testing a theory, economists should only
considerpredictiveability,notdescriptiverealism. Incontrast,institutionalists
judged the validity of a theory by its descriptive realism.
8 See also Anderson and Friedman (1960).8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
In“TheMethodologyofPositiveEconomics,”Friedman([1953]1953,30)
noted “...the perennial criticism of ‘orthodox’economic theory as ‘unrealis-
tic’....
[I]t assumes markets to be perfect, competition to be pure, and commodi-
ties, labor, and capital to be homogeneous....” Friedman ([1953] 1953, 31)
contended that “...criticism of this type is largely beside the point unless sup-
plemented by evidence that a hypothesis differing in one or another of these
respects from the theory being criticized yields better predictions for as wide
a range of phenomena.”
Friedman (tape recording, June 29, 1996) said:
The validity of a theory depends upon whether its implications are refuted,
not upon the reality or unreality of its assumptions. In 1945 and 1946,
there was a discussion in the economic literature about how to test a theory.
All of this derived from surveys of R. L. Hall and C. J. Hitch (1939)
who went around and asked businessmen, “Do you calculate marginal
cost?” and “Do you equate price with marginal cost?” Marginal analysis
assumes people are rational. The essence of this approach was, go ask
them whether they are rational! Do businessmen equate price to marginal
cost? Let’s go and ask them. My argument was that the assumptions
are utterly irrelevant. What matters is whether businessmen behave as if
the assumptions are valid. The only way you can test that is by seeing
whether the predictions you make are refuted.
Friedman gained a victory with the change in the way the economics
profession approached the determination of the price level. Through at least
the early 1970s, most economists approached the causes of inﬂation eclecti-
cally by advancing a taxonomy of causes. Gardner Ackley (1961, 421–57),
for example, in his textbook, classiﬁed the determinants of inﬂation under
the headings of “demand inﬂation” (“demand pull”), “cost inﬂation” (“cost-
push”), “mixed demand-cost inﬂation,” and “markup inﬂation.” Additional
variants used by economists included the “wage-price spiral” and “adminis-
tered prices.” The appeal of these nonmonetary explanations of inﬂation lay
in their apparent descriptive realism.
In contrast, the monetary framework used by Friedman attributed the be-
havior of prices to central bank policies that determined money creation. This
latterframework,despiteitssimplicity,ultimatelyprevailedbecauseofitspre-
dictiveability. Nonmonetarytheoriesofinﬂationnotonlyfailedtopredictthe
inﬂation of the 1970s, but also offered misleading guidance for how to control
it. Mainstream economists explained cost-push inﬂation as the inﬂation that
occurred when the unemployment rate exceeded full employment, which theyR. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 9
assumed to be 4 percent.9 This analysis made government interference in
the price- and wage-setting decisions of corporations appear as an attractive
alternative to raising the unemployment rate as a way of controlling inﬂation.
However, confronted, on the one hand, with repeated worldwide failures of
wage and price controls to suppress inﬂation and, on the other hand, with the
unique ability of central banks to control inﬂation, economists came around
to Friedman’s position that central banks were responsible for inﬂation.10
5. FRIEDMAN BECOMESA MONETARIST
The Depression had lasted for an interminable period and only disappeared
with the start ofWorldWar II.The belief was widespread that the chronic lack
of aggregate demand that had characterized the Depression would return after
the war. One reason that Keynesianism swept academia was the belief that
it offered an antidote to an inherent tendency of the price system to produce
recurrent spells of high unemployment. Friedman (tape recording, April 8,
1996) said:
At the London School of Economics the dominant view in 1932 and 1933
was that the Depression was an inevitable correction. It was an Austrian
view. It also prevailed at Harvard with Schumpeter and Taussig and at
Minnesota with Alvin Hansen, who wrote a book with that view. What
was important was the attitude that the Depression was something that
could be solved. The view in London, Harvard, and Minnesota was that
the Depression was a necessary cure for the ills that had been built up
before and should be allowed to run its course and correct itself. So it
was a very gloomy view. When Keynes came along and said here is a
simple explanation of the Depression and a way to cure it, he attracted
converts.
In the late 1940s, Friedman worked on macroeconomic stabilization poli-
ciesthatoperatedthroughrulesratherthandiscretionarygovernmentinterven-
tion. In 1948, in “A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability,”
he proposed that the government run a countercyclical budget policy with
9 The term “stagﬂation” arose to describe the simultaneous occurrence of high inﬂation and
high unemployment. As highlighted by the empirical correlations of the Phillips curve, stagﬂation
was at odds with the historical relationship between high unemployment and low inﬂation.
10 Friedman ([1958] 1969) pointed out the positive relationship between high rates of money
growth and inﬂation and between declines in money and deﬂation. At present, because of the
achievement of near price stability by central banks along with instability in the public’s demand
for real money (the purchasing power of money), money is no longer useful for predicting inﬂation.
However, Friedman’s basic point that inﬂation is a monetary phenomenon remains. That is, today
when economists look for an explanation of inﬂation, they look to monetary policy, not some
eclectic mixture of factors such as the market power of unions, government regulation, and so on.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
monetization of deﬁcits and demonetization of surpluses with budget balance
over the cycle. However, he was not yet a quantity theorist.
Friedman became a quantity theorist when he realized that he could en-
dow the quantity theory with predictive content by assuming that velocity was
a stable variable.11 Velocity was predictable because empirical investigation
showed that it depended on a small number of variables in a way suggested
by economic theory (Friedman 1956). The equation of exchange then be-
came for Friedman not simply a tautological identity but rather “an engine of
analysis,” the phrase of Alfred Marshall that Friedman used. After the war,
economists were familiar with the quantity theory but considered it an intel-
lectual relic—an irrelevance in light of the apparent powerlessness of central
banks to stimulate expenditure during the Great Depression. Once Friedman
came to see money growth as a predictor of inﬂation, he could rejuvenate
quantity theory analysis. He advanced the equation of exchange as a superior
alternative to the Keynesian autonomous-expenditures analysis for explaining
output.12
When Friedman went to Chicago in 1946, he was primarily an applied
econometrician. In 1948,Arthur Burns, who was head of the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER), teamed Friedman up withAnna Schwartz to
work on a study of the cyclical behavior of money. Friedman and Schwartz
([1963]1969) published the results of their work 15 years later. Their collab-
oration blossomed eventually into three NBER volumes on money: A Mon-
etary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (1963), Monetary Statistics
of the United States (1970), and Monetary Trends in the United States and
the United Kingdom (1982). As elaborated in Monetary Statistics, Friedman
and Schwartz created consistent statistical time series on money starting in
1867. The enormous efforts put into constructing series on money attest to
the importance they assigned to empirical investigation.
With the NBER money series, Friedman analyzed the behavior of money
and inﬂation in “Price, Income, and Monetary Changes in Three Wartime
Periods.” He compared the rise in the price level and nominal income in
the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. The price level rose by a
similar amount in each episode from the onset of the war to its subsequent
peak. Friedman argued that those periods constituted a useful experiment
for distinguishing between Keynesian and quantity theory explanations
of inﬂation.
11 The quantity theory is expressed by the equation of exchange—the algebraic relationship
between, on the one hand, the amount of money individuals hold and the rate at which they spend
it (velocity) and, on the other hand, nominal expenditure, which comprises the product of some
measure of real output or transactions and an appropriate price index.
12 Keynesian analysis held that output (income) expanded to generate the savings required to
match autonomous expenditures (government spending and investment).R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 11
According to Keynesian theory, the rise in prices and nominal income
should depend upon the way that government ﬁnanced the increase in war
expenditures. Accordingly, the rise in prices and nominal income should
vary inversely with the extent to which government ﬁnanced the rise in war
expenditures through taxes as opposed to deﬁcit spending. Friedman found to
the contrary that money, not ﬁscal policy, provided a satisfactory explanation
for the common behavior of inﬂation in these wars. The behavior of money
per unit of output explained inﬂation in each of the three episodes. Friedman
([1952] 1969, 170) concluded, “If you want to control prices and incomes,
they [the conclusions] say, in about as clear tones as empirical evidence ever
speaks, control the stock of money per unit of output.”
Friedman made his ﬁrst public statement supporting the quantity theory
in 1952 at the Patman hearings on monetary policy. Paul Samuelson (U.S.
Cong. 1952, 720) testiﬁed:
The current edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica mentions this formula
MV equals PT, and it says of the four [variables], three are completely
unobservable, and must be constructed, and on the basis of my provoca-
tive testimony this morning, the fourth [money] has been brought into
suspicion.
Friedman (U.S. Cong. 1952, 720) countered:
I believe that the quantity equation can be defended not only as a truism,
but as one of the few empirically correct generalizations that we have
uncovered in economics from the evidence of the centuries. It is, of
course, true that velocity varies over short periods of time. The fact of the
matter, however, is that these variations, especially of income velocity, are
in general relatively small. So far as I know there is no single equation
that has been developed in economics that has nearly as much predictive
power as this simple truism.
Friedman (U.S. Cong. 1952, 689) stated, “The primary task of our mon-
etary authorities is to promote economic stability by controlling the stock of
money....[M]onetary policy should be directed exclusively toward the main-
tenance of a stable level of prices.”
6. INTERNATIONAL MONETARYARRANGEMENTS
After World War II, the countries of Europe managed their trade bilaterally
so that transactions would balance country by country and there would be no
need for settlement in dollars (Yeager 1976, chap. 21). By spring 1947, there
were 200 bilateral agreements controlling trade in Europe alone. One goal of
the Marshall plan was to liberalize trade within Europe. Friedman spent the
fall of 1950 in Paris, where he served as a consultant to the U.S. Marshall Plan12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Agency. He analyzed the Schuman Plan, which would form the basis for the
European Coal and Steel Community. The latter, in turn, became the basis for
the European Common Market.
Friedman’s visit coincided with a German foreign exchange crisis and
precededasimilarcrisisintheUnitedKingdom. Inamemo, Friedman(1950)
arguedthatthesuccessoftheCommunitydependednotonlyuponelimination
of trade restrictions, but also upon the elimination of capital controls. Fixed
exchangerates,however,encouragedsuchcontrols. Incontrast,freelyﬂoating
exchange rates would render them unnecessary. That memo was the basis for
Friedman’s(1953)essay,“TheCaseforFlexibleExchangeRates.” Withﬁxed
exchangerates, Friedmanarguedthatthepricelevelvariedtocleartheforeign
exchange market by adjusting the real terms of trade (the price of domestic in
terms of foreign goods).13
Friedman’s view that the price level varied to achieve macroeconomic
equilibrium clashed with the Keynesian consensus, which viewed the price
levelasinstitutionallydetermined,especiallythroughthepricesettingoflarge
monopolies. Keynesian analysis emphasized the long-lasting adjustment of
quantities (real output and income), not prices in the elimination of disequi-
librium (Friedman 1974a, 16ff). Accordingly, with ﬁxed exchange rates, real
output would adjust to eliminate balance of payments disequilibria. This fun-
damental difference in views about the equilibrating role of the price level
carried over to the world of ﬂexible exchange rates. In this case, Friedman
argued that the price level was not institutionally determined but rather func-
tioned as part of price system by varying to clear the market for the quantity
of money. Changes in the price level endowed nominal (dollar) money with
the real purchasing power desired by the public.
With ﬁxed exchange rates, countries had to surrender control over the
domestic price level. Friedman ([1953] 1953, 173) argued, “It is far simpler
to allow one price to change, namely, the price of foreign exchange, than
to rely upon changes in the multitude of prices that together constitute the
internal price structure.” Friedman ([1953] 1953, 175) also made what has
becometheclassiccaseforspeculation. “Peoplewhoarguethatspeculationis
generally destabilizing seldom realize that this is largely equivalent to saying
that speculators lose money, since speculation can be destabilizing in general
only if speculators on the average sell when the currency is low in price and
buy when it is high.”14
Friedman’s wife, Rose Friedman, (1976, 24) commented later, “In a pat-
tern that has since been repeated in other contexts, his recommendation was
13 In “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” Friedman revived the quantity-theoretic price-
specie-ﬂow mechanism of David Hume that Keynes (1924) had used in A Tract on Monetary
Reform to explain the determination of balance of payments and exchange rates. See Humphrey
and Keleher (1982).
14 See also “In Defense of Destabilizing Speculation,” 1960 in Friedman (1969).R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 13
disregarded but the consequences he predicted occurred.” Increasingly in the
1960s, the United States resorted to capital controls to maintain the value of
the dollar set under the Bretton Woods system. The Bretton Woods system of
ﬁxed exchange rates ﬁnally collapsed in March 1973.
7. “MONEY MATTERS”
The heart of the quantity theory is the idea that money creation determines the
behaviorofprices. Friedmangaveempiricalcontenttothetheorybystudying
instanceswherehistoricalcircumstancessuggestedthatmoneywasthecausal
factor in this relationship. Friedman ([1958] 1969, 172–3) argued:
There is perhaps no empirical regularity among economic phenomena
that is based on so much evidence for so wide a range of circumstances
as the connection between substantial changes in the stock of money
and in the level of prices....[I]nstances in which prices and the stock of
money have moved together are recorded for many centuries of history,
for countries in every part of the globe, and for a wide diversity of
monetary arrangements....
In the 1950s, Friedman engaged in empirical work on the interrelationships of
money,prices,andincomeoverthebusinesscycle. Basedonthatwork,hede-
velopedacritiqueofKeynesianeconomicsandapositiveprogramofmonetary
reform. As noted above, Friedman championed his approach on the empiri-
cal grounds that the income velocity of money, emphasized by the quantity
theory, was historically more stable than the relationship between investment
(autonomous expenditures) and income, emphasized by Keynesianism.
In 1955, Friedman and David Meiselman (1963) began working on the
paperthatbecame“TheRelativeStabilityofMonetaryVelocityandtheInvest-
ment Multiplier in the United States, 1897–1958.” They calculated numer-
ous regression equations involving income and contemporaneous and lagged
values of autonomous expenditures and money. Because Meiselman had to
estimate the regressions by hand, the project involved an enormous effort.
Meiselman (tape recording, August 20, 1999) recounted that they had clear
results by 1958 but delayed publication until 1963 because of the time in-
volved in checking the calculations. Friedman and Meiselman demonstrated
that correlations between money and consumption were higher than correla-
tions between a measure of autonomous expenditure (net private investment
plus the government deﬁcit) and consumption. In Meiselman’s words (tape
recordingAugust 20, 1999), “The paper created an enormous stir.” 15
15An extensive literature appeared critical of the paper. Because of the rejoinders by Albert
Ando and Franco Modigliani, the debate was called the battle of the radio stations (AM versus FM).14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Later, Leonall Andersen and Jerry Jordan (1968) at the St. Louis Fed
performed a similar experiment. Their regressions showed that money, rather
than the full-employment government deﬁcit, was more closely related to
nominal output. They claimed that their results demonstrated the importance
of monetary policy and the impotence of ﬁscal policy. The Keynesian re-
buttals of the Friedman-Meiselman and Andersen-Jordan work made a valid
econometric point that the reduced forms these authors estimated were not
appropriate for testing a model. One needed to estimate a ﬁnal form derived
from a model. With such a functional form, the right-hand variables in the
regression would be exogenous and one could talk about causation.16
Nevertheless, the Friedman-Meiselman results surprised the profession
and created considerable consternation. They successfully made the point
that Keynesians had little empirical evidence to support their position. This
criticism provided a major stimulus to the development of large-scale econo-
metric models.
8. A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
1867–1960
Milton Friedman’s most inﬂuential work, coauthored with Anna Schwartz,
was A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960. It provided the
historicalnarrativesupportingthecontentionthatinmanyepisodes, monetary
instability arose independently of the behavior of nominal income and prices.
As a result, Friedman and Schwartz could infer causation from the empirical
generalizations they distilled in a way that guarded against the post hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy.17 Friedman and Schwartz ([1963] 1969, 220) wrote:
[A] longer period change in money income produced by a changed secular
rate of growth of the money stock is reﬂected mainly in different price
behavior rather than in a different rate of growth of output; whereas
a shorter-period change in the rate of growth of the money stock is
capable of exerting a sizable inﬂuence on the rate of growth of output
as well. These propositions offer a single, straightforward interpretation
of all the historical episodes involving appreciable changes in the rate of
monetary growth that we know about in detail. We know of no other
single suggested interpretation that is at all satisfactory.
See Hester (1964); the Friedman-Meiselman (1964) reply; Ando and Modigliani (1965); DePrano
and Mayer (1965); and the Friedman-Meiselman (1965) reply.
16 Basically, when the relevant variables are all determined together, their correlations say
nothing about causation. To test causation, the economist must express relationships with indepen-
dently determined (exogenous) variables on the right-hand side of regressions.
17 That is, it is fallacious to infer causation from temporal antecedence.R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 15
Most dramatically, Friedman and Schwartz documented that an absolute
decline in the money stock accompanied all the deep depressions they ex-
amined (1875–1878, 1892–1894, 1907–1908, 1920–1921, 1929–1933, and
1937–1938). At times, the inﬂuence of events, of political pressures, and of
the actions of the Fed on the money stock was largely adventitious so that
the resulting behavior of money could only be seen as an independent desta-
bilizing inﬂuence. Friedman and Schwartz examined in detail the following
events: the inﬂation accompanying the issuance of Greenbacks in the Civil
War and the deﬂation associated with the return to the gold standard in the
1870s;thedestabilizingpopulistagitationforfreecoinageofsilverandtherun
on banks in 1893; the inﬂation associated with gold discoveries in the 1890s;
and the economic contraction and deﬂation following the Fed’s increase in
the discount rate from 4 to 7 percent between fall 1919 and summer 1920.
With respect to the latter event, Friedman (1960, 16) wrote, “The result was a
collapse in prices by nearly 50 percent, one of the most rapid if not the most
rapid on record, and a decline in the stock of money that is the sharpest in our
record up to this date.”
Although other economists, including Irving Fisher and ClarkWarburton,
had argued for a monetary explanation of prices and the business cycle, the
argumentsofFriedmanandSchwartzweremorepersuasivebecausetheypro-
vided an explanation that rationalized the entire period from 1867 to 1960.
Although the Depression was extreme, it was still only a particular case. Even
though written for economists,A Monetary History was one of the most inﬂu-
ential books of the 20th century because of the way it radically altered views
of the cause of the Depression. Economists had interpreted the Depression
as evidence of market failure and the impotence of monetary policy to deal
with that failure. They believed the near-zero level of short-term interest rates
on Treasury bills meant that an “easy” monetary policy could not bring the
economy out of recession.
In contrast, Friedman and Schwartz explained the Depression not as a
failure of the free enterprise system that overwhelmed monetary policy, but
rather as a result of misguided actions of the Fed. The Fed, far from being
a passive actor as had commonly been believed, took highly destabilizing
actions. Forexample,infall1931,whenBritainwentoffthegoldstandard,the
Fedraisedthediscountratefrom11/2to31/2percent,adrasticcontractionary
move.18 Just as damaging was what the Fed did not do, namely, undertake the
open market purchases that would have reversed the decline in money.
18 For a succinct overview, see Friedman (1997).16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
9. THE NATURAL RATE HYPOTHESISAND
THE PHILLIPS CURVE
Friedman applied the same guiding principles of neoclassical economics to
the analysis of the inﬂationary monetary policy of the 1970s as he had to the
deﬂationary monetary policy of the 1930s. That is, the behavior of prices is
a monetary phenomenon and the price system works. To give content to the
ﬁrstidea, Friedmanrigorouslyappliedthequantitytheorydistinctionbetween
nominal and real variables in combination with the assumption that welfare
depends only upon real variables. As a result, the central bank can use its
control over nominal money (the monetary base) as a lever and the public’s
demand for the purchasing power expressed by real money as a fulcrum to
control the price level. However, it cannot systematically control the level of
real variables (the natural rate hypothesis).19
Friedman’s famous principle that “inﬂation is always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon” had originally referred to the positive correlation be-
tween trend money growth and inﬂation. In the period of stop-go monetary
policy, its spirit became that the Fed can maintain price stability without ei-
ther permanent or periodic recourse to high unemployment. This hypothesis
combined both of Friedman’s working assumptions: the price system works
and the price level is a monetary phenomenon. Friedman ([1979] 1983, 202)
expressed the hypothesis through the implication that ending inﬂation would
involve only a transitory increase in unemployment.
Friedman’s working assumptions challenged the macroeconomic models
of the day. The standard models of the 1960s elaborated the IS-LM apparatus
that British economist John R. Hicks used to make explicit Keynes’ model
in The General Theory (1936).20 Economists typically used such models to
explain the effects of monetary and ﬁscal policy on output without building
in explicit constraints based on unique full-employment values. They did so
based on the assumption that the price system works poorly to assure full em-
ployment. Because chronically the supply of labor supposedly could exceed
the demand for labor, stimulative aggregate-demand policies could raise out-
putandlowerunemployment. Also,thecentralbankcouldpermanentlylower
19A real variable is a physical quantity or a relative price—the rate at which one good
exchanges for another. A nominal variable is denominated in dollars. Patinkin (1965) began the
effort to incorporate the nominal-real distinction into macro models. His model, however, did not
incorporate Friedman’s natural rate hypothesis, but instead retained the assumption of disequilibrium
in the labor market that allowed aggregate demand policies to manipulate unemployment.
20 These models determined real output and the real interest rate jointly as the outcome of
market clearing where real output adjusts to generate savings equal to autonomous expenditures
and the real interest rate adjusts to make real money demand equal to real money supply (given
a ﬁxed money stock and price level).R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 17
the unemployment rate if it was willing to tolerate inﬂation. In short, these
models did not incorporate unique “natural” (full-employment) values of real
variables such as real income, the real interest rate, and the unemployment
rate.
To explain inﬂation, Keynesian models included an empirical relation-
ship exhibiting a permanent inverse relationship between (high) inﬂation and
(low) unemployment. The relationship took the name “Phillips curve” after
the discovery of such an inverse relationship in British data by the British
economist A.W. Phillips (1958). The explanation of inﬂation based on an
empirical relationship between unemployment (a real variable) and inﬂa-
tion (a nominal variable) reﬂected the prevailing eclectic-factors view of the
origin of inﬂation, that is, the absence of a uniﬁed monetary explanation. The
common assumption at the time that a 4 percent unemployment rate repre-
sented full employment implied that there should be no “aggregate-demand”
inﬂation with the unemployment rate above 4 percent. The inﬂation that did
occur with an unemployment rate in excess of 4 percent then had to be of the
“cost-push variety.” 21 If inﬂation was cost-push as indicated by the simul-
taneous occurrence of high unemployment and inﬂation, policymakers could
takestimulativepolicyactionswithoutexacerbatinginﬂation. Theappropriate
instrument for dealing with cost-push inﬂation was government intervention
into the price-setting decisions of ﬁrms (incomes policies).
In A Program for Monetary Stability, Friedman (1960) had criticized ac-
tivist aggregate demand policies with the “long and variable” lag argument.
That is, the combination of the inability to forecast economic activity and
the lags with which policy actions affect the economy renders destabilizing
actions taken today to control real output. With his 1967 presidential ad-
dress to theAmerican EconomicAssociation, Friedman (1968) expanded his
critique of activist policy by giving empirical content to the monetary neutral-
ity proposition of the quantity theory. He did so with his formulation of the
“expectations-augmented”Phillipscurve,whichembodiedthehypothesisthat
variation in the unemployment rate is related not to variation in the inﬂation
rate, but to the difference between inﬂation and expected inﬂation.
Friedman ([1968] 1969, 102–4) wrote:
[T]he Phillips curve can be expected to be reasonably stable and well
deﬁned for any period for which the average rate of change of prices,
and hence the anticipated rate, has been relatively stable....The higher
the average rate of price change, the higher will tend to be the level of
the curve. For periods or countries for which the rate of change of prices
varies considerably, the Phillips curve will not be well deﬁned....[T]here
21 Samuelson and Solow (“Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inﬂation Policy,” 1960 in Stiglitz 1966)
provided the ﬁrst sort of analysis along these lines.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
is no permanent trade-off [between inﬂation and unemployment]. The
temporary trade-off comes not from inﬂation per se, but from unanticipated
inﬂation.
Friedman’s hypothesis that monetary policy cannot systematically affect
real variables took the name “natural rate hypothesis.” 22 His speciﬁc formu-
lation in terms of the “expectations-augmented” Phillips curve also became
known as the accelerationist hypothesis: an attempt to target the unemploy-
ment rate will lead to ever-accelerating inﬂation or deﬂation, depending upon
whether the Fed sets the unemployment target too low or too high. To use
more recent terminology, the central bank cannot predictably control the val-
ues of variables determined by the real business cycle core of the economy,
that is, the economy stripped of monetary nonneutralities.
Keynesians understood the quantity theory as the proposition that “in the
long run” money is neutral. They thought of the quantity theory as little more
than the “long-run” homogeneity postulate that an equiproportionate rise in
all prices and in money leaves real variables unaltered (Samuelson and Solow,
[1960] 1966, 1,337). Because they thought of policy as being made in a
succession of short runs, there appeared to be little need to build monetary
neutrality into models used for macroeconomic stabilization. The natural rate
hypothesis as embodied in the expectations-augmented Phillips curve gave
the quantity theory assumption of the neutrality of money speciﬁc empirical
content by giving content to the distinction between long run and short run.
The long run became the interval of time required for the public to adjust its
expectations in response to a higher inﬂation rate. And, as Friedman argued,
the speed of adjustment of the public’s expectations depends on the monetary
environment. “[I]n South American countries, the whole adjustment process
is greatly speeded up” ([1968] 1969, 105).
Friedman’s formulation of the natural rate hypothesis with the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve yielded testable implications. Specif-
ically, the Phillips curve relationship between inﬂation and unemployment
would shift upward as trend inﬂation rose and expected inﬂation adjusted
upward. As a result, higher inﬂation would not produce lower unemploy-
ment. Friedman offered an explanation for the observed inverse relationship
between inﬂation and unemployment summarized by the Phillips curve that
implied the disappearance of the relationship in response to sustained inﬂa-
tion. ThestagﬂationoftheUnitedStatesinthe1970svalidatedthatprediction.
Friedman also predicted that even the short-run tradeoff would tend to disap-
pear as the variability of inﬂation increased. That prediction received support
22 See Friedman (1977) and Lucas (1996).R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 19
in studies across countries.23 Finally, Friedman ([1973] 1975) predicted the
failure of wage and price controls to control inﬂation.24
10. THE OPTIMAL QUANTITY OF MONEY
InadditiontohistheoreticalcritiqueoftheKeynesianPhillipscurve,Friedman
([1969]1969)alsomadeacontributiontothepuretheoryofmoney. Hepointed
out that the public can create real money balances costlessly by reductions in
the price level. However, while real money balances are costless to create,
individualsseeanalternativecostofholdingthemequaltothenominalinterest
rate. Therefore,theyholdfewerrealmoneybalancesthanaresociallyoptimal.
Friedman put the argument in terms of an externality. An individual’s attempt
to acquire an additional dollar of purchasing power will lower the price level.
Because the individual does not beneﬁt from the resulting capital gains other
holders of money receive, he does not hold the socially optimal amount of
purchasing power.
By setting money growth at a rate that causes a deﬂation equal in magni-
tude to the real rate of return to capital, the central bank can make the return to
holdingmoneyequaltothereturntoholdingbonds. Withthatrateofdeﬂation,
the nominal interest rate is zero. Friedman (1969, 34) wrote, “Our ﬁnal rule
for the optimum quantity of money is that it will be attained by a rate of price
deﬂation that makes the nominal rate of interest equal to zero.” 25
11. STOP-GO MONETARY POLICYAND INFLATION
As a result of the effort begun in the mid-1960s by the Fed to manage the
economy, money growth began to ﬂuctuate irregularly around a rising trend
line. Friedman consistently predicted the results. For example, at the Patman
23 See Lucas, “Some International Evidence on Output-Inﬂation Tradeoffs,” 1973, in Lucas
(1981).
24 One of Friedman’s contributions to economics was to formulate hypotheses in a way that
stimulated further theoretical innovation. Muth (1960) applied the idea of “rational expectations”
to address the optimality of Friedman’s use of exponential weights on lagged income as a proxy
for permanent income. Lucas formalized Friedman’s theoretical critique of the Keynesian Phillips
curve in two seminal papers. In his “natural-rate rational-expectations” formulation of the Fried-
man “expectations-augmented” Phillips curve, Lucas ([1972] 1981) applied Muth’s idea of rational
expectations to macroeconomics. He did so to address the “accelerationist” aspect of Friedman’s
formulation of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. Lucas noted that with rational expecta-
tions, even accelerating money growth will not lower unemployment because the public will come
to anticipate the acceleration. That is, can the Fed lower the unemployment rate persistently if it
is willing to raise inﬂation indeﬁnitely? Lucas ([1976] 1981) also generalized Friedman’s critique
of the Phillips curve as being a “reduced form” relationship dependent upon a particular past mon-
etary policy rather than, as assumed by Keynesians, a “structural relationship” invariant to changes
in monetary policy. For further discussion, see Sargent (1987).
25 In this paper, as shown in the heading of the ﬁnal section, “A Final Schizophrenic Note,”
Friedman (1969) did not intend this rule as a practical guide to policy.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Hearings in 1964, Friedman (1964 in U.S. Cong., 1,138) noted, “Over these
ninedecades,thereisnoinstanceinwhichthestockofmoney,broadlydeﬁned,
grewasrapidlyasinthepast15monthsforaslongasayearandahalfwithout
being accompanied or followed by an appreciable price rise.” In the event,
CPI inﬂation almost tripled, rising from 1.3 percent in 1964 to 3.6 percent in
1966.
Friedmangaveforcetohisideasbyinterpretingtheeventsofthe1960sand
1970s as experiments capable of distinguishing monetarist from Keynesian
ideas. He argued that the 1960s furnished the kind of controlled experiments
necessary to distinguish whether the deﬁcit exerted an inﬂuence on output
independently of money. In 1966, Friedman argued that monetary policy
was tight and ﬁscal policy expansionary. The economy slowed in 1967, as
Friedman, but not Keynesians, predicted. In 1968, the situation reversed.
Fiscal policy was tight because of the 1968 surtax and monetary policy was
easy. The economy became overheated in 1968 and early 1969. Friedman
(1970, 20) wrote:
In the summer of 1968...Congress enacted a surcharge of 10 percent on
income....[W]e had a beautiful controlled experiment with ﬁscal policy
being extremely tight and monetary policy extremely easy....[T]here was
a contrast between two sets of predictions. The Keynesians...argued that
the surtax would produce a sharp slow-down in the ﬁrst half of 1969
at the latest while the monetarists argued that the rapid growth in the
quantity of money would more than offset the ﬁscal effects, so that there
would be a continued inﬂationary boom in the ﬁrst half of 1969...[T]he
monetarists proved correct.
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon imposed wage and price controls.
Friedman ([1971] 1972) forecast their eventual failure: “Even 60,000 bureau-
crats backed by 300,000 volunteers plus widespread patriotism were unable
duringWorldWarIItocopewiththeingenuityofmillionsofpeopleinﬁnding
waystogetaroundpriceandwagecontrolsthatconﬂictedwiththeirindividual
sense of justice. The present, jerry-built freeze will be even less successful.”
Friedman ([1971] 1972) forecast that the Fed would cause the breakdown of
the controls through inﬂationary monetary policy and successfully forecast
the date when inﬂation would revive: “The most serious potential danger of
the new economic policy is that, under cover of the price controls, inﬂation-
ary pressures will accumulate, the controls will collapse, inﬂation will burst
out anew, perhaps sometime in 1973, and the reaction will produce a severe
recession. This go-stop sequence...ishighly likely.”
Oncemore,towardtheendofthe1970s,Friedman([1977]1983)correctly
forecast rising inﬂation:R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 21
Once again, we have paid the cost of a recession to stem inﬂation, and, once
again, we are in the process of throwing away the prize....[Inﬂation] will
resume its upward march, not to the ‘modest’ 6 percent the administration
is forecasting, but at least several percentage points higher and possibly
to double digits again by 1978 or 1979. There is one and only one basic
cause of inﬂation: too high a rate of growth in the quantity of money.
12. RULES VERSUS DISCRETION
Friedman made a general case for conducting policy by a rule rather than
through discretion in his essay, “Should There Be an Independent Monetary
Authority?” He ﬁrst repeated the standard argument for discretionary im-
plementation of policy. Using the example of voting case by case on the
exercise of free speech, Friedman (1962a, 239, 241) then offered a rebuttal
that emphasized how a rule shapes expectations in a desirable way:
Whenever anyone suggests the desirability of a legislative rule for control
over money, the stereotyped answer is that it makes little sense to tie the
monetary authority’s hands in this way because the authority, if it wants
to, can always do of its own volition what the rule would require it to
do, and, in addition, has other alternatives; hence, “surely,” it is said, it
can do better than the rule.
If a general rule is adopted for a group of cases as a bundle, the existence
of that rule has favorable effects on people’s attitudes and beliefs and
expectations that would not follow even from the discretionary adoption
of precisely the same policy on a series of separate occasions.
13. THE PERMANENT INCOME HYPOTHESIS
The idea had been around for a long time that an individual’s consumption
depends upon long-term income prospects or upon wealth rather than current
income. Friedman (1957, ix), in particular, acknowledges Margaret Reid for
ideas on the measurement of permanent income. Friedman’s contribution
was to give these general ideas empirical content by expressing them in a
form capable of explaining a variety of data (cross-section and time-series) on
consumption.
Friedman (1957, chap. 2) used the analytical framework of Irving Fisher
(1907,1930)tomodelhowanindividualdistributeshisconsumptionovertime
(given his endowments, preferences, and the interest rate). The interest rate is
the intertemporal price of resources, which reconciles the household’s desire
to“‘straightenout’thestreamofexpenditures...eventhoughitsreceiptsvary
widely from time period to time period” with the cost of doing so (Friedman
1957, 7). Friedman’s formulation of the permanent income hypothesis made22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
him a pioneer in development of the optimizing framework that is the basis
for modern macroeconomics.
Friedman gave Fisher’s framework empirical content by modeling in-
come as composed of uncorrelated permanent and transitory components, an
idea borrowed from Friedman’s earlier work, Income from Independent Pro-
fessional Practice. According to Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis,
an individual’s consumption depends only on the permanent component of
income. Friedman also employed the hypothesis that individuals form expec-
tationsofthefutureasageometricallyweightedaverageoftheirpastincomes.
In A Theory of the Consumption Function, Friedman (1957) used a sin-
gle theory to explain why the savings ratio rises with income when income
and consumption are measured with cross-section data, but remains constant
when measured with time-series data. He argued that family budget studies
show savings rising as a fraction of income as income rises because measured
incomeincludestransitoryincome. Somefamilieswithlowmeasuredincome
in a given year are experiencing temporarily low incomes, so they maintain
their consumption at a relatively high level and conversely with families with
transitorily high measured income. Consequently, the savings rate appears
to rise with income. Aggregate data, however, show savings as a fraction of
income remaining approximately constant at around 0.9 as income has risen
secularly. Because transitory income averages out in this case, it does not bias
the measure of the savings rate.
14. FREE MARKETS
Friedmandefendedfreemarketsindefatigablyandineveryforum. LikeAdam
Smith, he explained how markets and the price system harness the efforts of
individuals to better themselves in a way that improves the general welfare.
More than any other individual over the post-war period, Friedman moved
the intellectual consensus away from the belief that a rising standard of living
rested on central planning to the belief that it rested on free markets.
Friedman advanced public understanding of the operation of markets
through his free-market proposals to solve problems. His ﬁrst collection of
suchproposalscameinCapitalismandFreedom(Friedman1962b). Although
inevitably controversial, many of Friedman’s proposals came to fruition. Ex-
amplesareﬂexibleinsteadofpeggedexchangerates, eliminationofthe1970s
pricecontrolsonenergy,avolunteerarmy,andauctionsforgovernmentbonds.
Some of his proposals have met with partial success. Examples are elimina-
tion of usury laws, a ﬂat tax (1986 tax reform), free trade, indexing of the tax
code for inﬂation (1981 tax changes), negative income tax (in the form of the
Earned Income Tax Credit), and vouchers (in the form of charter schools).
Some of his proposals have met with failure but have provoked useful debate.R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 23
Examplesarethelegalizationofdrugsandeliminationofthepostalmonopoly
on the delivery of ﬁrst class mail.
There is no way to review succinctly Friedman’s defense of free markets.
A single example among countless must sufﬁce. In congressional testimony,
Friedman (U.S. Cong. 1964, 1,148–51) had the following exchange with a
congressman over usury ceilings:
Vanik: Is there not another way to stabilize interest rates simply by the
establishment of national usury laws?....[T]his is not price control....It
goes to our very heritage.
Friedman: I believe that that is price control.
Vanik: But it has its roots in morality.
Friedman: No, I hope that Jeremy Bentham did not write in vain.
Vanik: There is not any relationship between interest rates and human
decency?
Friedman: There may be a relation between a market in which interest
rates are free to move and human decency....I believe there is much
evidence to support this belief, that such a limit will reduce it....What
happens, when you put on a usury law in any country, is that the borrowers
who most need loans are driven to get the loans at much higher rates of
interest than they otherwise would have to pay by going through a black
market.
Vanik: Does not a usury law have the effect of stabilizing the cost of
money...?
Friedman: No, its only effect is to make loans unavailable. Consider
price control in general. The effect of price control, if you set the price
too low, is to create a shortage. If you want to create a shortage of
loanable funds, establish a ceiling on interest rates below the market, and
then you will surely do it.
Vanik: [T]he whole thing is concerned with the economy, the way it is
going to move along and expand, without the drag that high interest rates
might impose on it.
Friedman: I wonder if you would mind citing the evidence that high
interest rates are a drag?
Vanik: Well, I am not here answering the questions....Now ,youadvocate
surplus or at least sufﬁciency of the money supply but you have given
us no assurance that it is going to be available...[at] any reasonable
price....[M]oney...differs from anything else—this is not wheat. This
is not bread.
Friedman:...[I]n a free market, the price rises because there is an increase
in demand. If people...want to buy more wheat or more meat and this24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
raises the price then such a rise in price is a good thing because it
encourages production in order to meet the demand, and the same thing
is true on the market for loans....The second comment I would like to
make is that one of the difﬁculties in our discussion is the use of the word
“money” in two very different senses. In one sense, we use “money” to
mean the green paper we carry around in our pockets or the deposits in
the banks. In another sense, we use “money” to mean “credit” as when
we refer to the money market. Now, “money” and “credit” are not the
same thing. Monetary policy ought to be concerned with the quantity of
money and not with the credit market. The confusion between “money”
and “credit” has a long history and has been a major source of difﬁculty
in monetary management.
15. CONCLUDINGAPPRAISAL
Societies develop a sense of shared identity through the way they interpret
the dramatic events of the past. The interpretation of historic events requires
ideas—the stock in trade of intellectuals. Milton Friedman became one of
the most inﬂuential intellectuals in the 20th century because of the impact of
his ideas in redeﬁning views of the Depression and in shaping contemporary
views of the Great Inﬂation from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s.
The Depression represented not a failure of the capitalist system, but rather a
breakdown in U.S. monetary institutions. The economic instability and rising
inﬂation in the decade and a half after 1965 represented the stop-go character
of monetary policy.
A major reason for Friedman’s success as an economist was that he com-
bined the intellectual traits of the theoretician and the empiricist. Theoreti-
cians think deductively and try to understand the world around them in terms
of a few abstractions. Empiricists think inductively and try to understand the
world around them through exploration of empirical regularities. Friedman
possessed both traits. Friedman’s theoretical temperament appeared in his
attraction to the logic of neoclassical economics. At the same time, Friedman
forcedhimselfrelentlesslytoformulatehypotheseswithtestableimplications.
By 1950, Friedman had adopted two working hypotheses that guided his
entire professional life. First, central banks are responsible for inﬂation, de-
ﬂation, and major recessions. Second, the price system works well to allocate
resources and maintain macroeconomic stability. For a quarter century af-
ter 1950, the consensus within the economics profession remained hostile to
these ideas. A symbol of the triumph of the ﬁrst principle came in October
1979 when FOMC chairman PaulVolcker committed the Fed to the control of
inﬂation. A symbol of the second came in fall 1989 when the BerlinWall fell.
Friedman applied the analytical apparatus of neoclassical economics in-
defatigably to understand the world. He was one of the great intellectuals of
the 20th century in that he used ideas and evidence to change the way an in-R. L. Hetzel: Contributions of Milton Friedman 25
formed public understood the world. In his understanding of how competitive
markets combine with individual freedom to better individual well-being and
the prosperity of society, Friedman was a true heir ofAdam Smith.
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